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The Property Risghts of Married Women is a subject
that has recently been agitating the minds of both legislators and jurists, but it h-s not, until within the last fif-

tv, years, been dealt with to further the rights of the
feme-covert more than they were at

the comncn law;

which,

in this respect, did not fulfill the demancs of justice,es is the purpose of the whole system of jurisprudence.
Certain it is that

the subject is one of rrreat impor-

tance, and one with which every member of the legal profession should be familiar.
I propose in this wvork to give first, the basis on
which legislation is founded second, the doctrine in equity
and third, the various statutes and enactments that have
been passed in Pennsyrlvania.
Until recently the subject has not been definitely,
settle d.
7c'ouler, in his "Domestis Pelations," in accountinfor the conflict of cases, states that the confusion arises from the different schemes that are at the foundation of the property rights of "arried parties.
1st.
The Common-law Property qche-e which is tie
basis of our jurisprudence, and in which the unityr of the
'arriage relation is the primarv point.
To secure this unity the 1aw starts with the assumption that the wife's legal existence is suspended or
7tin.riished du-rrn
covertuie.
T he has no rirdit or intersest In the husband's rropertv, whether it be acquired
hefo-e or durinr cov.erture, except dower in his -eal estate

and a right of inheritance to his propertyr,can usuallv

of which he

deprive her.

The husband,

on the other hand,

loses nothing of his

independence by marria-e, but is entitled to all the wife's
personal property in possession absolutel,, and to all
)utstanding debts or choses in action if

he reduce them to

possession,- which he can do, as he has all control over
them.

He also has a right to the use of her real estate,

and a possibility of a future estate as tenant by the
curtesr.
If the wife survive the husband, she takes only her
real estate, such choses in action as have not been reduced to the husband's possession, and her paraphernalia.
As an attempt to equalize the burdens of marriage,
the husband is obliged to pali all debts contracted by the
wife while a feme-sole, and liable for all just debts incurred for her support while the marriage relation exists.
And if there is a debt between parties to a marriage contract, marriage extinguishes it.
The

rife can not sue o-

be sued in her own name,

nor

can she bind herself bu her contract, though she may bind
her husband as agent,

either where the husband has failed

to furnish the necessary supyort,- and she has done noth-

ing to absolve him from his duty- or where she acts as
his agent, and mar bind him to the extent of her authority.
2nd.

The Civil Law Property Scheme which pays lit-

tle rerard to the idea of unity, but rather considers
husband and wife as

distinct

persons,

with separate

the

rights

and capable of holding distinct and separate estates.
The wife was responsible for her debts, and competent to
sue and be sued on her own contracts;

and her property

could not be subject to anr liability or engagement of
the husband.

This is found in the Roman law prior to

the time of Justinian.
3rd.

The Cormnunity Property Scheme which is

mediate to the Civil and Common Law Schemes.

inter-

This is

also thought to have been part of the Roman law, but at
an earlier period than the Civil Law Scheme.
The relation between husband and wife under this
Scheme is similar to the partnership relation, and the
community property is primarily liable for payment of
debts.

This partnership applies to all property ac-

quired during marriage, and debts must be satisfied first
out of the corinurity property or es t ate.

Sometimes the

community is iiversal, comprising all property had be-

fore,

or at the time of mar-iage,

ed during coverture.

This Scheme is

portance, and in states where
is

to limit,

as well as that acquirof very little im-

it is in use the tendency

rather than extend it.

As was said before, the Common Law Scheme is
sis

of our jrrlIsprudence.

were opened they saw that
existence,-

As

the eyes

the ba-

of the reople

the married womTen had no legal

that with a single exception she had no rigbts

and that the set forms of the Common Law could not afford
the required protection.

But what the law could not do,

equity did, and created in the married woman a separate
estate, so that her existence is no longer lost in that
of her husband.

And, though she is not as independent

as before marriage, she may, when the interests of herself and heqr husband conflict, contract on her own behalf,
sue and be sued in hir own name, and hold lands, goods,
and chattels in her own right,-

which property is known

as her separate estate, or an estate limited to her separate use.
The question of primary impnrtance then, was,
What will amount to a separate estate?
cases we find that the separate

From the various

estate may be created by

any express statement in a conveyance stipulating that

the property or fund is not to be subject to the husband's control, and, though no particular words are necessary, there must be a clear intent to bar the husband's
marital right.

(Trltt v Colwell, 31 Pa. St. 228.)

If the wonan be married, o- in immediate contemplation
of marriag-e, a conve-ance fo- her ovn uise will create in
her a separate estate, as where there was a devise to a
widow, for life, with proviso that, in case of marriage,
her husband should have no dominion over hir propert-r.
(Craig v Watts, 8 Watts 498.)
It is also held that if the wife be living apart
from her husband, under articles of separation, and acquires personal property by hr unaided labor, she ma,7
regard it as separate estate and dispose of it by will
or otherwise.

(Wagner's Estate.

2 Ash 448.)

Again, if the wife be deserted by her husband,though a court of law would not give her justice- equity
will allow her the earnings of her own labor.
Appeal.

26 Pa. St. 233.)

(Spier's

But, if the legal title is

vested in the feme, there is no separate estate.
Appeal.

(Todd's

24 Pa. St. 429,) nor is there one if there is a

devise to a married daughter with limitation to her heirs
in case of her death.

(Krause v Beitel.

3 Rawle 199.)

In McBride v Smyth, 54 Pa. St. 245, it is held that
a devise in trust for a daurhter will not create a separate use unless she be married, or in !Trnediate contemplation of marrIiare.

But if she be divorced from her

husband, or voluntarily withdraws from him, in the event
of separation such trust is for hqr separate use.

(Perry

v Boilean, 10 S. & R. 208.)
A married woman may make a loan to her husband from
her separate estate and he would become her debtor by
piving a certificate that he had borrowed money from her.
(Hind's Estate, 5 Wharton, 138.)

Although such certifi-

cate would be void as a contract, yet the object intended
was the use of the wife's money consistent with her ownership.

The Court of Equity looks to the intent rather

than to the foyi, and will interpret it so as to produce
the results which the parties intended.
Thourh equityr did a great deal to give the married
voman her rights, there was
the mari+al obligations.

ret a great Inequality as to
But, in the onward march of

reform, modern legislators, actuated by a spirit of justice and wisdom, have, to a great extent, remedied thq
injustice of the Common Law.
On the eleventh of April, 1848 an act was passed in

the Pennsirlvania Legislature
of married women.

rights

and effect,

"That every

intending tr

secuire

The act provided in
species

the

substance

of' property belonrlig to

an,, single woman shall continue to be

er property as

fully after her marriage as before, and that all such
property of whatever kind, which shall accrue to any married woman during coverture,

shall be owned and enjoyed

by such married woman as h-r own separate propertr;

and

that anif such property shall not be liable for debts or
liabilities of the husband, nor sold, mortgaged, transferred, or encumbered by him in any way, without her consent acknowledged before any judge of court of comm~on
pleas."
The principal object of this statute, or its general
intent, was to prevent the wife's property from being
swept away by a husband's creditors.

As the law was be-

fore the passage of the statute, the husband, by marriage, became the absolute owner of the wife's choses

in

possession, both those she had at the time of marriage
and those that she subsequently acquired.

He was en-

titled to the use and enjoyment of her real estate, owning its rents,

issues and profits.

As a natural conse-

quence, all the property she brought to h'r husband, ex-

cept a remaindir i

rcl

es+a+e after his death,

we3 li-

able tr be seized and sold at the suit of his creditors.
Thiis,

the wife who had brcmight, proper+,,

mirht see it

all

to h-r husband

swept al,,a, T and herself left. destitute,

through +he improvidence, misfortune, or even vice of her
husband.

It may have gone to pa.T debts contracted be-

fo-e marriage,
whatever.

from which the wife received no benefit

Such a state of affairs could not but appeal

strongly to the synpathy of the legislators.
As a matter of course,

a gvrea+ deal of litigation

grew out of the passage of this act,

and the courts were

called upon to interpret or construe it.

One of the

first questions that arose was whether the statute should
be liberally or strictly

construed.

In the earlier cases the courts have taken the strict,
or literal interpretation.

Placing this construction

on the statute it works a radical change in the status
of the feme-covert, giving her power to dispose of her
separate estate, by will or otherwise, as a feme-sole.
The married woman must also be considered as a feme-sole
in regard to anir estate, of whatever name or sort, owned
by her before marriage, or any which shall accrue to her
durring coverture by, will,

descent,

deed of convelrance or

otherwise.
Later cases in the Supreme Court have over-ruled the
earlier decisions, interpreting the statute according to
its spirit and intention.
Blackstone tells us that there are three points to
be considered in construing a remedial statute,-

the old

law, the mischief, and the remedy- and also that it is

+he business of the judges so to construe the act as to
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.
The later decisions hold that this act means nothing
more than a protection against the husband's creditors,
and that the intention is the same in case of property
Theld before marriage as to that acquired during marriage.
It prevents the husband from acquiring property1 in the
wife's choses in possession, from reducing choses in action to his possession, and also defeats his right to use
real propnrtv,-

ti'is removing the whole estate from reach

of creditors and prpserving it for the wife.
It could not have been the intention of the Legislature to inpai
relation.

tie

unity or intimacv, of the marriage

This must necessaril-v -esult if

a s~rict or

lfteral interpretation be placed on the statute.
husband must ask the consent of the wife ever-

If the

time he

should wish to use her furniture or house there would be
a serious impairing of this relation.
The husband,

at the Common Law,

was the trustee of

the wife's equitr-ble estate if there was no one

lname d in

+he instrument creating the estate,- and his right in
this direction has not been changed.
is

And the same rule

applied to the separate earnings of the wife under the

statute, as was used in eqiit$,.r before its passage.
If the husband's interest in the wife's real estate
is sold, the purchaser can not recover possession in an
action of ejectment against him, as the act protects both
title and possession of the wife's interest in her separate property, (MCElfatrick v Hicks, 21 Pa. St. 402) and
in a clear case,

a creditor may be restrained by injunet-

ion from levying upon and selling the wife's real estate
for her husband's debts.
194.)

(Hunter's Appeal, 40 Pa. St.

But the wife must show, by evidence which does

not admit of a reasonable doubt, that the property, was
purchased from her own separate estate or the presumption is that the goods were purchased out of means furnished by the husband.

(Flick v Devries, 50 Pa. St. 266.)

It is not enough that the wife had means of paying the-e
must be proof of actual payment by her,

out rf

h,r sepa . -

ate funds,

(Gault v Saffin, 44 Pa. St.

rule is not required as to creditors.
Keichline 54 Pa. St. 75, holding that:

307,)

tPough this

Koechline v
"Except as against

creditors the wife is only bound to establish her title
by an ordinary derree of proof."
Althouph this act prevents the husband from encumbering her property, yet the wife can not convey her real
estate by deed without joining her husband, nor create a
lease without his concurrence; nor execute an obligation
for payment of money, or give bond or warrant of attorne',,-

in fact, her powers to contract are not enlarged to

any great extent.
It is provided that the husband shall not be liable
for debts of the wife contracted before marriage, and in
Biery v Ziegler, 93 Pa. St. 367, it is held that a husband is not liable for rent of a house leased to the wife
before marriage, though she continue to live in it for
some time after the ceremony was performned.

The separ-

ate property of the wife may be taken for such debts,
however, and no wrong will result to the creditors.
The wife may have power to contract in three cases:
1st.

Where the contract is to carry on her separate

trade or business.

2nd.

Whe-e the contract

for the benefit
3rd.
tate is

of,

\Where the

is

made

her separate
intention to

in

relation

to,

or

estate.
charge her separate

es-

expressed in the instrument or contract by which

the liability is

created, or may be clearly

implied from

the circumstances.
In any of these three cases the wife mar have power
to contract without consent or approval of her husband.
In the first case, if the husband shall refuse or neglect
to provide for the wife,-

either from drunkenness or pro-

fligacv, or any other cause,-

or shall desert her, the

wife is allowed to have all the privileges of a feme-sole
trader,-

that is,

all propertr acquired, of whatever kind,

is her own, and subject
durinp life,

to her free and absolute disposal

by will or otherwise,

ence on the part of her husband,testacy,

her next of kin shall

were dead.

v.ithout an,,

interfer-

and in case of her in-

take as

if h-r

husband

She may also sue and be sued without joining

her husband.
The statute

means mo'ro than the mere rentinq of a

house, or the buying of a single article,-

it has refer-

ence to business pursuits, mechanical, manufacturing, or
commercial.

The mere care and supervision of lands and

13
property owned by a feme-covert is not the carrying on of
a separate trade or business.

If

!

v'ere so,

eves7f mar-

ried worian who owns a house and garden, or had a deposit
4n a bank would be a tradeswoman.
Under the act of Mair 4,

185,

it

is

not necessary

that th'e wuife be decreed a feme-sole trader in order to
entitle her to the benefits of the act as to holding or
conveying her property in her own name.

She can not be

held liable as a feme-sole trader unless she be engaged
in

some trade or business

for a livelihood.

or emplnyment pursued b', her

She mavr convevr her real estate with-

out her husband joining in the deed, (Wilson v Coursin
72 Pa.

St.

300)

and such conve,,ance w!ill bar his rights

as tenant b' the curtesy.
This act secures to the deserted wife not merely the
rights and privileges of a feme-sole trader under prior
acts, but it also confers upon her the absolute and unqualified right to dispose of her own prop-erty,
personal, as it ma, seem best to her;
testate,

real and

and if she die in-

her next of kin takes the property as though the

husband were dead.

The fact that a feme-sole trader is

living with her husband does not take away her privileges
under this act.

+his act of

Among the questions that arose as to

This was

1S55 was one as to its constitutlonalitv.
brought up in

M6ninger v Retnnv,

104 Pa.

S-.

298.

In this case the husband claimed that the act was unconsti+1tional and void, as it

infringed on some marital

But the coiirt held that the act was founded on

rights.

the very reason that the ma-riage contract had been violated,

would not be rig7ht for the husband to claim

and it

his marital

his ovm misconduct

righ+s after

his marriage

con

t

in

violating

ract.

The married woman may be decreed feme-sole by p-e-

desertion byr her husband,
fusal

to

forth any circumstances as to

setting

senting a petition

neglect or re-

or his willful

pvovide for her, if

be substanti-

such petition

The hus-

ated by twro witnesses, and the court sees fit.
band,

by such willful

b-v his desertion

neglect,

or refusal

for one year or more,

to provlde,
right

loses all

tenant by the curtesiy and also his rights under

or
as

the in-

testate laws.
The second place where
tract

the wife has power to con-

is in regard to improving and repairing he-

ate estate.
circumstances.

separ-

This she may do at any time and under an,.
The statute provides that

the husband

15
shall

not

encumber the estate

did not have

in

ani

polwer given her,

this

wa-,,

it

brought

mus

t

might be-

the estate

ITcowrvj, ,

come untenantable, or sink into decay.
action is

the wife

and if

if

an-,

aver her covertlie and 'hat

tlle

debt was contract,-d upon her a,tho , tv and was for the
improverent of her

epara+e es+ate.

in Dearie v

Fo

Martin, 78 Pa. St. 55, a mechanic's lein was filed against
the proprt7

of a married woman,

verture and that

withoLt averring tlhe

the labor done and mate rial

co-

furnished

upon her authority or by her consent was for the improvement of her separate estate, and is held as fatally defective and void.

Llo,d v Hibbs, 81 Pa. St. 306,' and

Schriffer v Saum 81 Pa. St. 385, holding the same way.
Yet, if judgment be had after service, and stands unreversed, it may not be attacked collaterally,

and a sale

by, the sheriff will pass a good title.
But where the wife furnishes money or its

equivalent

from her separate estate and receives the benefit of it
in common with her hisband, she

is not allowed to recover

it as a portion of her separate estate.

In Gleghorn v

Gleghorn, 118 Pa. St. 383, a bill was filed in equitT byr
a wife, against her husband, to recover a sum of money
expended by her to aid in the erection of a dwelling for

their common home upon real estate fThrnish- d bThe court held that where the wife's moneyr
b"

t

he husband and appropr-iat'd b1 him,

is

him.

reclived

at her request,

towards the building of a dwelling hoiise for the common
home of both,

without circumstances

lation of debtor and creditor,

indicating the re-

the wife maV not reclaim

the money by a subsequent rroceeding against the husband.
Thouph the holding would probably have been different if
it

had been shown that the intention of the parties was

that the money furnished by the wife 'shonld be used as
her separate property,

or if

she had made it

as a loan

to her husband.
On this point it is also held that judgment given
b1T

a justice-of-the-peace against a married woman, in a

joint action against husband and wife, is void unless

the

record shows that the debt for which the suit was brought
was contracted by the wife and incurred for articles necessar-V for support of said husband and wife.

(Gould v

McFall, Ill Pa. St. 66.)
The next class of cases where the wife is

allowed

to contr-act is where the intention to charge her separate
estate is

expressed in the instrument or con+tract by

which the liabilit-r is created, or where it mayr be clear-

-v Implied.
In

these cases g-ea,

stress

is

laid uron the point

that there must be some intene on to charge,tion may be expressod or implied,
It

is

no'

necessnry,

tl nt

b9 t it

this jnt-n-

must be there.
in

the wife bind herself

writ-

ing, a parol agreement to charge is enough if it be for
the benefit of her separate estate.
Where the debts are contracted for necessaries the
wife's estate can not be charred unless execution has
been returned unsatisfied against the husband.

In

the

case of Bair v Robinson, 103 Pa. St. 247, the wife was
held liable for the funeral expenses of her mother,

who

had lived and died in her household,-.the husband having
no estate.

Held to be necessary

for the support and

maintenance of 1he family of such married wonan.
In

such cases the c 1 -7dltor can not recover unless

he prove that

the wife contract'd the debt,

articles were necessary

and that +he

for the sirnort of the family of

The wording of the statute is:

husband and wife.

"Judgment shall not be 1,ndered against the wife in
joint action unless
debt sued for in

it

such

shall have been proved that the

such action was contractued by the wife,

or incurred for necessaries for the support of the family

of husband and wife."

The

courts have inte rpreted the
thus making

word "or" as meaning and,-

urovo that it, vTs both contracted b
the debt
It

contractjd,

was

fo-

it

ti
.

necessary tr
wife,

and that

necessa-_4es.

is held a sufficient declaratin, aVhe-c! a ma,-ried

woman is cha-ged ;r;th labilitv,
her for labo- done,, that

on a contract made with

"said work having been done at

her request in and about the management of her separate
es-ate, and necessarT

for the preservation, enjoyment,

use and profit of said separate

istate."

(Botts v Knabb,

116 Pa. St. 28.)
The courts also held that this section does not apply to debts contracted for necessaries before the passage
of the act.
Until the act of 22 April, 1863, this act allowed
the same rules

to arply to an- conveyance of prorerty b,

a married woman which took

effect subsequent to act of

1948, unless such case had been adjudicated by the Supreme Court.
If the feme-covert had no power to convey, the Legislature cannot validate such deed of conveyance.
(Shonk v Brown, 61 Pa. St. 321.)

And

17

tne wife have

separate property conveyed to her by will and there is a

restrictive clause in the will with-holding the right to
encumber the property,
clause,

the statute

does not affect

and she can not transfer

such

such estate.

The wIfe may, be sued alone in case the husband shall
have deserted her, or separated himself from her for one
,rear or more,

and is

living

out of +he coiutv ,K'>-re she

resides so that service of process
both.

In

such case she may be sued for necessaries

support of family,
liable

7_indr'

cannot be had against

if

her separate estate wouid have been

the existing laws;

tractec!

for rerairs

tate.

And by t -

for

or if

or improvements

the debts were conon her separate

es-

S-econd Section of the Act of 11 June,

1870, she may bring action against her husband in such
case of desertion,

or where she has

been abandoned or

driven from her home by her husband,i+

bir her next friend,

or trustee,

and need not bring

as she was formerlr

requirerl to ro.
Until the act of 25 April, 1850, was passed it was
thought

tha+ the ,rife could bS'ng suit

ferne-sole,

Section 20 of that act r-'nvides

name of such ma-rid

her own name as

her husband to recover her prop,-Y~tv.

or join

-ry of an-, prop--T+

in

'

that suits

for te -'ecov-

of a married woman ma-T be brouiiht
wcman and her husband.

If +he

in

action is

broufht against

th-i

husband and wife 'nde

the

act of 18'8, with a view rf charging 'he wife's separa+e
estate, she may appeal without the husband joining in the
appeal.
In an action for pre'sonal

injuries to a married wom-

an,

.the action should be b-'orpht b-r the husband and wife;

but

the husband must file a stipulation that he will not

bring any action in his own name to recover damages, and
that any damages recovered shall be for the separate use
of the wife.
The wife ma-T loan money to her husband and take, as
securit",,

a judgment or mortpage against his estate

in

the name of a third p-rson who shall act as tumsteQ for
h ".

This authority implies a rower to arrange the terms

of the loan and to provide for the payment of both interest and principal,-

thus assuming tlhe character of a con-

tract binding on both parties.

If it should appear' +hat

there was coercion or fraud practiced by the husband in
securing the loan, the
ment to the wife.

courts will compel immediate pay-

And where a married woman has entered

into such an n.reerent she can not rescind It on nrocurIn- a divorce from h-?r hushand,
is shown on his part.

unless

coercion or fraud

If thTe hushad has deserted or refused to provide for
tTe wife, or if shie he divorced from his b,,d and board,
shie may hrinp an action of slander or libel

raianst hin

throuph her rext friend.
Portions of te
h,

act of 11 April, 1948 were repealed

acts of 11 April, 1356, and 14 Mair, 1874.
lst.

As to the acknowledre?-et of the deed or mort-

are of married women, and
2nd.

As to whom it should be ackno,'-leded before.

In the first of tlese acts the repeal was of so much
of tbe act of 1848 as required the consent of a married
woman to be first had and obtained, or the acknowledge-

ment of her deed and mortage when conveyring her real estate to be made differentl", from that which she is authorized to make when she joins her husband in conveying
real estate.
The second act repeals the portion requiring the
deeds or mort aees to be acknowledged before one of the
jures of the court of common pleas, and enacting that
the,, m",,l

be acknowlecired before any officer authorized

to take acknowledgements.
As to the separate earnings rf a married woman;-

whether the- shall be as wages for labor, salarv, pror-

-rtv,

lrsrsiness or oth-wise-

the , will inure and ace-e

to -he sonara+e benefit and iise of said married woman,
and are under her exclusive control,

and not suhiec

to

claim of her husband or his creditors.
As therq mic-ht

be some fraudulent rractices

Pard to this portion of the act,
provid-d that if

in

re-

the Le~islature further

the married woman wished to take advan-

tage of this rrovision, she must present a petition, under oath or affirmation, to the court of common pleas,
stating her intention to claim the benefits of such act.
This petition must he filed or recorded and is

made con-

clusive evidence of intention of such woman.
If

a married woman who has become entitled to her

separate earnings, under act of April 3,
money on h' r

1872, borrow

personal credit, whether possessed of a sep-

arate estate or not, and therewith in good faith purchase
a stock of !oods

with which to en~aze in

business,

the

goods may not be seized and sold for a debt of her husband.

(Orr v Barnstein, 124 Pa. St. 311.)

right to property is

When such

found to exist her husband may not

onlyT act as he " agent,

but he has a leral right to give

her his labor and skill in conducting such business, and
his creditors can not sell her property,

produeed by his

for his debts.

and labor,

skill

Although the wife can not brin7 an action of debt
her husband,

arainst
it

h-r next

alone or b

either

friend,

is held In Frefler v Freller 1P6 Pa. St. 470, that

a married woman joinred with heqr husband may~maintain an
action arafnst

the firm of which he is

a member,

and re-

cover damages for a breach of covenant in a lease of her
real

The hiusband, though served with the writ,

estate.

making default
no ripght

of the husband to make a

and can not use it

defence of coverture
from the Just

to shield themselves

creditors.

claims of their
If

The firm acquires

of appearance and plea.

the husband of a married woman has been found to

t'lv, crnmon
or othe-7v4-sc,

of competent

by a court

be a lunatic,
1

t',

and the wife owns land in

she ma-T conver

subject

to rig!-ts

without

his

'urlsdiction

the same b-

of the Tisband unde?

joining in

One reculiari+',

in

express provisinn that

writhin

fee simple,

deed or mortgage,

t- e

intes+ate

laws,

the deed.
+he statrte

is +ha+ th

is

an

a married woman contract for

if

the purchase of sewing machines for her orn use, the contract shall be valid and binding without
having the husband join

in

the contract.

he necessity? of
I can find no

reason for making this express

designation of sewing ma-

chines rather than other articles for household use.
As the legislators have enacted that the wife should
have her separate estate it was necessar-, to give her the
power of dispositlon over it.
April,

1848,

provides,that

Section 14 of act of

1 -

"Any marrir:d woman mayT dispose,

by her last will and testament, of her separate propertir,
real, personal or mixed- whether the same accrue to her
before or during coverture."'
limited to propnyr-r

And this provision is not

acquired after the passage of the act.

If the married woman dies without making disposition of her property,,

it

will be distributed as provided

for in the intestate laws.

The husband is not deprived

of his estate as tenant by the curtesy, but is entilled
to enjoyr it

the same as at common Law.

But during the

life of the wife he had no power to sell lease, or in anyr
wa , affect her real estate, as he had no present inte -es.
theeein.
Some legislation arose fr-om this section of the
statute,

and by an act of 22 April,

l80,

explanato-r

of

act of 1843, it was p-ovided that the act of 1348 was not
intended to affect the veste-d rights of husbands, and
that his

estate by

the crtesI

is

exempt from levy

during

the life

of the wife.

And h,, act of L April,

1863,

it

was enacted that "No judgment obtained against a married
man before or during marriage shall bind or be a lien
upon the wife's separate estate or any interest the husband

*maT

have as

tenant by the curtesy."

The sRine provision exists as to the husband as exists

in

favor of the wife in

regard to electin7 whether

to take under will or under the statutory intestate law.
Another privilege granted to married women was the
right to be the incorporators and officers in
tion organized for the purpose of learninr,
charity,

or religion,

any corpora-

benevolence,

- makin7 marriage no disability.

The legislation on this subject seeiis to have culminated in the Married Persons Property Act of 3 June 1887,
by which the married woman is practically set free from the
disabilities of coverture.
The enactment is as followvs:1st.

Marriare shall not be held to impose any disability

on or incapacity in a married woman cs to the acquisition,
ownership,

possession,

ertyof any kind in

control,

use or disposition of prop-

aiy trade or business

engage, or for necessaries,

in

and for the use,

improvement of her spearate estate,

which she may
enjoyment and

real or personal,

or

her right and power to make

contract of any kind, ard to

give oblirations, bindir' herself therefore;
ried woman shall have
sess,
real

manner as

every mar-

the same right to acquire, hold, ros-

irmnrove, control, use or dispose
and pe-sonal,

but

of her property

in possession or expectancy,

if she were feme sole, without

in the same

the intervention of

any trustee, and with all the rights ard liabilities
de'nt the-eto,.exc--nt -s her-in provided, as
married;

inci-

if she were not

and property of every kind owned, acauired or

earned byr a woman, before or during her marriarre shall belo-rr to Tier and not to her hushsa-d, or his creditors.
Provided, however, that a married woman shall have no power
to mortgage or convey her real estate unless her husband
joins in such mortgage or conveyrace.
2nd.

The married woman shall be capable of entering into

and rendering herself liable upon a-v contract, relating
to any trade or business in which she may engate, or for
necessaries, and for the use, enjoyment and improverent
of her separate estate, and for suir'

or being sued, either

upon such contract or for torts done to or cornitted by he9
in all respects as if she were a feme sole and her husband
need not
party

-e joined F-s plain t iff or defendant, or be made -

to anir action, suit, or legal proceeding of anyr kind

brought by or against her in
3rd.

her individual

rirht.

Any debt, damages or costs recover-d by her in any

such action, suit or proceeding shall be her separate property and any debt, damages or costs recovered against her
in anir such action, suit or other proceeding shall be payable out of her separate property and not otherwise.
4th.

11othinp in this or any preceding section shall enable

a married woman to become accomodation endorsor, guarantor,
or surety for another.
5th.

A Married woman ma,7 make,

of her property,

execute and deliver leases

real and personal,

and assignment,

trans-

fers and sales of her separate personal property, and notes,
bills, drafts, bonds or obligations of any kind, and appoint attorneys
essary
dth.

and it

shall

for her husband to be made a party
Husband and wife shall

upon contracts
persons

in

their

not be nectherein.

have the same civil

own name and riht,

for the protection,

property,
7th.

to act for her,

remedies

against all

and recovery of their

separate

as unmarried persons.

A married woman mav dispose of her property,

personal,

by last

will

and testament in

writing,

real

and

signed by

her or manifested by her mark or cross made by her,

at thp

end thereof in the same manner as if she were unmarried.
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In

Small v Small 129 Pa.

ried Prrsons

't. 366 it

is

held that

the Mar-

Prope rty Act of 3 June 1887 does not author-

ize the wife to sue her husband directly and in her own
name for the recovery

of money received hy him from her

Although the languape of Sect. 6th.,

separate estate.

takino in itself is perhapq, broad enough to include an
action by one directly against the other, but the act as
a whole canrnt fairly he construed as authorizing such an
actior.
Until 18A8 the people had not held liberal views as to
the married woman's status, - or if they had, these views
had not found expression.

From that time to this, the

tendency has been to increase h-r rickets;

but as her prop-

erty rights are enlarred so are her liabilities, and
where she is

allovrd to hold a separate estate that s'ep-

arate estate is

still

liable for debts contracted by her-

self and for the benefit of silch estate.
The statute has had very little effect on the rights
of the husband, but it has remedied a rreat defect in removing the liability of ha-rin

the wife's property swept

away for the husband's dbts.
At the present time the-e are few, if any chanfes to
be made to better the condition of the married woman in

-

29.
-ard to her property rights.

The last enactment it may

be said, 'hsswept away the last vestige of bondage that
remained to mark the existence of the Common Law.
The legislators of Pe-lrpylvanti,may look vith pride
on the advancement they have made,
that they stand wit

as well as on the fact

the legislators of New 'lork as the

pioneers of the movement.
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